Introduction
The current enthusiasm for "relationship marketing" brings with it a number of problems. In particular this paper will suggest that, unless a counterintuitive definition of a "relationship" is used, it is impossible for firms not to have relationships -indeed that a firm does not have the choice as to whether or not it has relationships. Instead the paper will suggest that what is important is that a firm should determine, given its particular circumstances, what types of relationships are appropriate with each of its customers.
What sort of "relationships" do firms need?
With practising managers, consultants and, not least, academics all looking for ideas which will provide them with a competitive advantage, "fads" are a well recognised feature of management thinking. Whether or not "relationship marketing" will turn out to be a fad, it has already entered into the "rhetoric" of management (Keltner, 1995 ) and yet, while like all fads it has an initially intuitive appeal, at the present the concept lacks clarity. For example, in consumer markets the term is often used where a relational database is used to underpin a supplier's marketing activities with the customers not necessarily being conscious that they are participants in a relationship marketing campaign. In comparison in many organisational markets relationship marketing involves the establishment of "a relationship" which is explicitly recognised by both buyer and seller. However, in spite of this lack of clarity, many assertions are being made about the importance of "relationship marketing" with influential writers stating that "companies must move from a short-term transaction-orientated goal to a long-term relationship-building goal" (Kotler, 1992) .
In fact, unless a counter-intuitive definition of "relationship" is used, everybody and all organisations have some relationships (Anderson and Narus, 1991) . However, the depth of these relationships will vary from those where "a relationship" might be said to exist, that is where both the supplier and the customer recognise, accept and act on their mutuality of interest (Blois, 1996) , through to situations where, although the customer and supplier do have a relationship (because they do business with one another), it is one whose characteristics are those of discrete exchange. It has been suggested (Blois, 1997) that an observer watching two organisations' behaviour as they conduct an exchange can only make an assessment of the current state of their relationship when:
• they have knowledge of the contractual terms under which the exchange is being conducted;
• they can observe the exchange process over extended periods of time; and
• the participants give explanations of the reasons why the observed actions were undertaken.
Don't all firms have relationships?
The reason for proposing this is that it is arguably the way that those matters which do not fall within a contract are handled that indicates the quality of a relationship, for while in any exchange situation it may be impossible to specify ex ante the response which will be made to unpredicted contingencies, both parties have an expectation ex ante of the criteria which would determine an appropriate or equitable fulfilment of the exchange. In other words the exchange will be governed by some accepted principle and this principle will be used to select behaviour in all situations -whether unpredicted or not -where there is more than one possible response. Thus in a discrete exchange contract law would be appealed to; in other exchanges custom and practice might be invoked as the guiding principle; in others some form of dispute resolution mechanism might be used; etc. However, in "a relationship" the overriding guiding principle would be the maintenance of the two parties' goal interdependence.
There are, however, two difficulties with such a guiding principle. The first is that, as implied above, the give and take that the application of such a principle requires often only produces equitable responses over a period of time. Therefore a great deal of trust may be required by one or both parties. Thus a supplier, with limited capacity, which has developed a new design might be asked by a customer to permit a competitive supplier to use that design so that final customer demand can be met. The customer might promise to compensate the first supplier in some way when the next round of contracts are placed. For the supplier to agree to such a proposal requires it both to trust in the customer's good intentions and to believe that circumstances will be such that the customer will be able to honour their commitment. However, many factors outside of the customer's control may make it impossible for the customer to do this.
The second difficulty is that organisations do not make decisions -people do in the name of organisations. So, except where there is a tight legal contract, the interpretation of such "give and take" arrangements relies on the behaviour of individuals. But individuals leave organisations and also change jobs within their organisations and such changes may have an effect on both the company's culture and its relationships for two reasons. First, interactions with the customer's staff may be changed. Second, it may affect the type of mutual trust between members of a management team which would enable, say, a marketing manager, if they believed it to be essential for the sake of a relationship with a customer, to agree to a change which will require alterations to the production schedules without first referring to the production manager.
It is important to recognise that, while it is individuals' interpretations of events and the decisions that they consequently make which determine how a relationship evolves, it is the interpretation of those decisions by individuals in other organisations which determines the reputation of that organisation. Thus if two organisations are establishing or have established a relationship it is the interaction of their two cultures which creates the relationship and this is not only mediated by the behaviour of individuals but is the creation of individuals' interpretation of events.
In spite of the uncertainty as to what "a relationship" is the current interest in relationship marketing may encourage a greater recognition that costs are incurred when building and maintaining relationships and therefore that the investments made into a relationship should be carefully evaluated. It may also consequentially create a greater awareness that relationships are
A great deal of trust
People make decisions "market investments" (Johanson and Mattsson, 1985) or assets but that they have positive and negative aspects with their value being determined by the relative importance of these aspects. Clearly, even with regard to a specific individual customer, the assessment of the balance between these positive and negative aspects may vary between suppliers for a whole variety of reasons. The examples of NECX, which does not have "relationships" in the sense that some writers (e.g. Kotler, 1992 and Grönroos, 1994) propose is the model, and of the KGF Bank (fictitious name), which maintains a variety of relationships, demonstrate a number of these features.
NECX Inc. -successful because it avoids "relationships"? It is often helpful to take extreme examples to make a point. NECX is such an example. It demonstrates that the types of customer relationships which are appropriate for one highly successful business may not be close; may not be high on mutual commitment; and, may only involve limited co-ordination -all of which have been identified (see below) as features found in "relationships". It will also show that the types of relationship which are best for NECX are in part determined by its own organisational structure and consequently the way in which its costs are built up.
Owned by two individuals, who started it in a domestic kitchen in 1980, by 1995 NECX was the world's largest independent distributor of integrated circuits and computer products with a turnover of about $450 million; no debt (other than to suppliers); and, no equity from outsiders. It acts as an intermediary between chip makers and purchasers worldwide -sometimes being a broker and sometimes a dealer (Damore, 1995) and makes its profits by being a supplier of last resort to whom customers turn when they cannot get supplies from their regular sources. Indeed it is where "the panic-stricken turn when the official distributors fail them" (Churbuck, 1994) . It will meet such customer's requirements in one of two ways. Either it is holding the item in stock on a speculative basis or, if it is not, then it will seek out a supplier which does hold stocks of the item, buy the item and after repackaging it resell it. The core of its activities is its large electronic trading floor (which bears a striking resemblance to the fast-paced environment of a traditional stock exchange) where the worldwide availability and pricing of semiconductors are continuously reflected on a big board as over 75 multilingual, professional traders work the open market 24 hours a day seven days a week.
NECX has a policy of repackaging all items before selling them with the aim of maintaining as high a degree of anonymity between its customers and its sellers as is possible. The reason given for doing this is that anonymity protects both the buyers, who are having difficulties in maintaining their output because of supply difficulties, and the sellers, who have surplus stocks, from being identified. More importantly though it makes it difficult for NECX to be bypassed by a customer in future going direct to the supplier(s) or vice versa.
From the descriptions given of the nature of "relationships" (see below) it is arguable that it is inappropriate for NECX to establish "relationships" with its customers. NECX exists purely because there are uncertainties of both supply and demand and it makes its profits by its ability to "wheel and deal". In fact it behaves opportunistically in the sense that it charges a price which reflects the urgency of the customer's need while having bought at a price which reflects the supplier's desire to offload unwanted stock -stock which rapidly becomes obsolescent. It is arguable that NECX would feel inhibited in "exploiting" shortage situations if it had "relationships" with its customers. However, it must be stressed that there is nothing unethical about making money in this way and for a firm to position itself as a supplier of "last resort" is a perfectly respectable thing to do. Indeed the customers of such firms are glad that they exist and that they know of them -though they are even more glad that they rarely have to make use of their services! While some suppliers of "last resort" have regular purchase arrangements with their suppliers, where a firm operates in the same way as NECX then its suppliers are also happy that they exist but are also glad that they do not have to use them too often.
Thus, compared with companies manufacturing chips (e.g. Intel or Siemens) not only is NECX not a manufacturer but it makes its profits by offering a very different service. The manufacturers will have organisations designed to be efficient at supplying the market's requirements based upon their forecast of demand and while doubtless they can cope with some variations in demand they can only do this within limits. In particular they are unlikely to be able economically to meet sudden large increases in demand while unexpected falls in demand will leave them with surplus stocks of rapidly dating items. In comparison NECX exists to cope with the uncertainties of both supply and demand. Although from time to time it holds stocks of chips on a speculative basis, its ideal is to know where there are surplus supplies of chips so that when approached by a potential customer it can make a trade.
NECX's assets include knowing where it can obtain chips surplus to others' requirements and being known by firms which may face unforeseen shortages. However, it is questionable if it wishes to have "a relationship" with any customer for there is nothing to suggest that doing so would be economically beneficial. In terms of the costs of its operation there may be some benefits arising from knowing a customer's style of business, creditworthiness, reputation, etc. For example, early in its life NECX suffered a loss of $80,000 on a single trade due to lack of knowledge of one its customer's other business connections (Charbuck, 1994, p. 236 ). Yet these benefits seem unlikely to have the same potential significance as those which manufacturing firms obtain from relationships (Kalwani and Narakesari, 1995) when set against the disadvantages of having a "relationship". For NECX such disadvantages would include restraints on its ability to get the best price for a chip for two reasons. First, a "relationship" client would not expect the supplier to behave opportunistically by exploiting a shortage situation. Second, where more than one customer needs an item which is in short supply, the supplier would feel obliged to give priority to its "relationship" customer even though other customers might be willing to bid a higher price to obtain supplies.
KGF bank committed to relationship management
The KGF Bank, which has publicly committed itself to a relationship management strategy, reviews its relationships with the firms in its market each year and categorises them into one of seven categories. The review is based on an analysis of the effort which the bank has expended and the revenue obtained from each customer in the previous 12 months plus estimates of the potential revenue for the next 12 months. The sevenfold classification draws attention to a number of aspects of relationship management and marketing. In particular the following issues are raised:
A different service
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• the variety of relationship forms which are available;
• the need to recognise the customer's viewpoint; and
• the "light and dark side" of relationships.
The seven categories are:
(1) No wish to be a supplier. Potential customers may fall into this category for many reasons. For example, it might be that the bank's view of the customer's standards of behaviour, activities, etc. leads it to feel that association with such a customer might have a negative effect on its reputation. Thus there are financial institutions in the City of London which have effectively "black-listed" certain potential customers because they are concerned about their inclination to follow what is euphemistically called "sharp practice".
(2) Prospecting. Here the bank's knowledge of the customer is very limited and it is still seeking to understand the customer's business and its strategies at the simplest level. For example does the prospect organise the purchase of financial products through a central office or does it delegate responsibility to the management of each of the territories in which it has offices? Only when the bank has a thorough understanding of these matters is it able it to put together a product offering which may look attractive to that client. Part of the activity when prospecting is for some of the bank's employees to make contact with their counterparts in the prospect's organisation and through this for the bank to become accepted as a competent, helpful and imaginative potential supplier.
(3) A competitive supplier. Here the bank is already supplying at least one product to the customer and it knows that, not only are its competitors supplying similar products, but that the customer's policy is to continue to split the available business between two or more suppliers. Furthermore, while the product is only one of several which the bank could supply, the customer discourages attempts by any of its suppliers to cross-sell other products. The customer is perceived to prefer an "arms-length" relationship.
(4) A valued niche supplier. In this case the bank still only sells one or two products out of the range which the customer is known to purchase but, where it is a supplier, it is the largest (sometimes the sole) supplier of these products. The bank therefore has a close relationship with a part of the customer's organisation but because the customer discourages crossselling it cannot easily use this as a basis for obtaining additional business. This because its knowledge of the customer's financial requirements is not detailed enough to enable it to present a package of financial products which together take account of the customer's detailed financial strategy.
(5) A valued diversified supplier. The bank in this situation supplies several products to the customer but it may not be the dominant supplier of any one and certainly not of more than one product. The customer does not discourage the bank from seeking to increase its share of the supply of any of these products. There are opportunities for cross-selling either on a product or a geographic basis and the bank has the possibility of developing the relationship into that of being a major supplier but this will require the investment of a considerable amount of managerial effort usually over a period of time.
A negative effect "Arms length" relationship
(6) A major supplier. Here the bank is the dominant supplier of a number of products which the customer sees as being of particular importance to its financial strategy. The customer expects the bank to consider how the products it is offering together support its financial strategy. To be able to do this the bank's staff need to have very close relationships with the customer's staff in individual sections but also its senior staff must have sufficient access to the customer's senior financial team to be able to understand the customer's financial strategy in depth. The bank appoints a client manager who is responsible for the whole relationship and who has "authority" over other staff (including those more senior than him/her) who may be responsible for the individual products being supplied.
(7) A strategic partner. When this stage has been reached the bank is perceived by the client as the automatic place from which to seek advice and the bank almost has the right of first refusal for any new business opportunity. Furthermore the bank is perceived by the financial community to occupy this position and is thus automatically associated with the success or the failure of the client's financial strategy. A relationship manager is appointed to manage the relationship but the intent is to manage the relationship back to being a major supplier because of the perceived disadvantages of such a close relationship (see below).
What is a "relationship"?
It still seems that "(t)he perception of RM (viz Relationship Marketing), however, varies between authors" (Gummesson, 1994) and that there is not agreement regarding what can be defined as "relationship marketing". Furthermore some writers use terms such as "relational marketing" and "relationship exchange" which often seem similar if not synonymous. Yet, because these terms are not always defined, this may be an unwarranted assumption which further complicates the situation.
Where definitions of "relationship marketing" are given they do not indicate the activities which might be used in implementing a "relationship marketing" policy. Neither do they indicate the required inputs or features which would enable an observer to determine if such a policy was being followed. For example, some writers make it clear that "relationship marketing" has as its aim "the dual focus of getting and keeping customers" (Christopher et al., 1991) . Others state that the essence of relationship marketing is the supplier's creation of commitment and trust between itself and a customer with the intent of "establishing, developing, and maintaining successful relational exchanges" (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) . Certainly the statement that relationship marketing's "operational contents are unclear" (Gummesson, 1994) still holds true and little work seems to have been undertaken on establishing what the activities are which lead to the creation and maintenance of "a relationship".
Most definitions emphasise "long-term" or "lasting" relationships but sometimes they appear to be the aim of establishing a relationship while in other cases they are portrayed as the result of a relationship. Many writers now stress the need for mutual commitment and trust, commitment being a desire to maintain a relationship which is often indicated by an ongoing "investment" into activities which are expected to maintain the relationship. "Trust" is less clearly defined with some writers equating it with reliability (though whether or not there is a fundamental difference between "trusting" and "relying" is a matter of dispute) but in general it being taken to mean an
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acceptance of vulnerability to another's possible, but not expected ill will (or lack of good will). The view stated is that commitment and trust are key components of a relationship because they encourage partners:
• to make investments into the relationship;
• to resist taking advantage of alternatives which provide short-term benefits; and
• not to behave opportunistically with regard to the relationship (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) .
What type of relationship?
It has been has suggested that the customer's view of the desirability of entering into a "relationship" will be affected by its perception of the likely size of the transaction costs involved (Blois, 1996) . A customer, it is suggested, will seek that form of relationship which it believes will minimise the need for them to incur high transaction costs. A further perspective has been introduced (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995) through the emphasis that while there are benefits in any relationship there are also disadvantages and that, when determining how close a relationship to seek to develop with another organisation, a firm must recognise that there are trade-offs to be made. A firm cannot operate in total isolation but, if it wishes to maintain some independence, it must not become involved in a relationship which completely smothers it.
Hakansson and Snehota (1995) have suggested that there are five negative factors or disadvantages which result from being in a relationship. These are:
(1) Loss of control. Developing a relationship inevitably means giving up, to some degree, control over such matters as resources, activities and even intentions.
(2) Indeterminedness. A relationship is changing all the time. Its future is uncertain and is, in part, determined by its history but also by current events and the parties' expectations of future events.
(3) Resource demanding. It takes effort to build and maintain a relationship. This can be viewed as an investment and a maintenance cost (Blois, 1995) .
(4) Preclusion from other opportunities. Given that resources are limited and that building and maintaining a relationship is resource demanding, then there is always a need to prioritise the use of resources and it may not be possible to pursue all of the individually attractive opportunities. Furthermore some potential relationships, which in isolation may look attractive, may be irreconcilable with an existing relationship.
(5) Unexpected demands. The other party in a relationship will also have other relationships. This means that establishing a relationship actually means being linked, if only passively, into a network of relationships. The "membership" of such a network may bring with it obligations or expectation by others of specific behaviours.
The degree to which each of these factors exists will vary according to the nature of the relationship and, as has been made clear, the degree to which each is a disadvantage will vary within individual relationships. Thus a particular relationship may not lead to much loss of control but may make substantial resource demands. However, there is a reverse side to the coin and some of the benefits derived from relationships arise from these five factors. Yet the difference between a benefit and a problem is frequently 
Size of transaction costs
Nature of relationship very slight and will be contingent on specific circumstances. Thus, "preclusion from other opportunities" may be perceived as a golden cage or a prison depending on, for example, the alternatives open at any time.
NECX and its relationships
It is clear that NECX cannot have "a relationship" with its partners (either suppliers or customers) in the sense that some writers refer to relationships. The nature of its business is such that it:
• would not wish to make an investment in a relationship because it must feel free to go where it can obtain the lowest purchase price and the highest selling price;
• would not be concerned with attaining a "return on investment" in a relationship because it must feel free to take a short-term view as that is when arbitrage opportunities exist; and
• must be free to behave opportunistically.
Indeed NECX makes money by exploiting its suppliers' and its customers' unpredicted contingencies -its exchanges are certainly not guided by the overriding guiding principle of the maintenance of both parties' goal interdependence. There would seem to be little benefit to NECX in allowing relationships to develop with either its customers or its suppliers which would lead to any of the five features identified becoming dominant issues (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995) . Thus:
(1) Loss of control. If NECX developed relationships with one or more customers it might compromise its ability to sell at the highest attainable price. As this is the basis on which it make its profits such a constraint would be a serious disadvantage.
(2) Indeterminedness. It would seem inevitable that for NECX any relationship it develops will be very uncertain. Suppliers would ideally not wish to have output surplus to their customers' requirements. Customers would ideally prefer not to face the uncertainty and cost of seeking emergency supplies. Neither of these two groups would thus wish to commit themselves to deal with NECX in the future.
(3) Resource demanding. Given the indeterminedness of their relationship there is no economic logic in NECX investing much in relationships with individual customers.
(4) Preclusion from other opportunities. The basis on which NECX makes its profits is the freedom to behave opportunistically and NECX cannot afford to enter into any relationship which would preclude it from dealing with any supplier and/or customer which offers the opportunity of making a profit.
(5) Unexpected demands. Given NECX's need not to be limited in its dealings with suppliers and customers, it would not wish its relationship with another organisation to place it under any obligation either to deal or not to deal with another firm in that organisation's "network".
Furthermore NECX's organisation and way of trading make it very difficult for close relationships to develop between its staff and either its customers' or its suppliers' personnel. Given that it is individuals' interpretation of events and the decisions that they consequently make which determine how a relationship evolves, this lack of consistent personal interaction makes the development of anything other than very limited trust most unlikely thus making "a relationship" almost impossible.
Exploiting suppliers and customers
Yet NECX must and does have relationships -the problem is not whether or not relationships exist but with the generality of the terms used to discuss "relationships". For example, the basis on which NECX makes its profits is to behave opportunistically with regard to imbalances of supply and demand. Yet the anonymity that it provides is only of value if both its customers and suppliers trust NECX to maintain it and not to make inappropriate use of its knowledge of their affairs by, say, letting a customer's competitors know that it is in difficulties because of a shortage of component supply. There must also be trust between itself and its suppliers that not only will an order be honoured but also that the quality of the chips supplied will be acceptablethere is not time (nor the necessary organisational structure) to allow NECX to check quality. Again its customers must trust NECX only to deal with trustworthy suppliers.
Strategically a company should determine what type of relationships are ideally appropriate to its circumstances but in reaching that decision it must take account of the type of relationship which its customers find acceptable. So it is also important to consider whether or not NEXC's customers would wish to have a "relationship" with NECX for, whatever NECX's preferences, account must be taken of the type of relationship which its customers would find attractive. However, it does not seem unreasonable to presume that most of NECX's customers will not wish for a "relationship" for this could constrain their ability to use NECX only as and when it suited them i.e., when their regular suppliers are unable to meet their requirements. Yet they would wish to have the type of relationship within which they are recognised by NECX to be trustworthy customers.
Where a supplier finds that a customer's view is not congruent with that which it holds then it must adapt its own position to meet that customer's viewpoint. The alternative is to take steps which will lead the customer to find some alternative arrangement acceptable. For firms with a limited number of customers this process may result in them managing several different types of relationship -perhaps even a different one for each customer (Macdonald, 1995) . Given the way that NECX is organized the neither of these approaches is feasible and so NECX recognises that there are some potential customers with whom it will never do business.
The KGF Bank's view of relationships As was indicated above, the bank reviews client relationships every 12 months using some historic information relating to costs and revenues plus forecasts of the next 12 months activity. However, an important element in the reclassification procedure is the inclusion of a number of qualitative inputs. First, what is known of the client's view of relationships? The range of positions adopted by clients is very wide. For example, there are some who seem to have no policy -in such cases is it worth the bank trying to first demonstrate and then develop the value of close customer/supplier contact? Some clients seem to resist attempts to develop close relationshipswhere this is the case then it may be that is appropriate for the bank to remain a competitive supplier or a valued niche supplier. To try to change the customer's position will, at best, involve costly activity probably over a long period, but at worst might annoy the client. Other clients seem keen on building "relationships" but what are they seeking from such relationships? Do they really see relationships as being based on "mutually recognised goal interdependence"?
Importance of trust
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A second qualitative input is an assessment of the bank's resourcesespecially its staff resources. There would be little point in seeking to develop a major supplier relationship if the staff with appropriate experience are not available to act as client managers. The availability of staff of the correct calibre is a major difficulty for such banks and in consequence they often face the problem of allocating scarce resources in response to estimates of the potential revenue. Alternatively it might have difficulties in balancing the various levels of management required to handle the mix of relationships open to it. This so-called "leverage problem" (i.e. the average proportion of time required to manage an account by professionals of different seniority) is the classic cost problem in professional services. The issue then becomes one of allocating scarce resources in response to estimates of the potential revenue. This may mean that, although there would seem to be an opportunity to become a major supplier, the bank will decide that it is better to maintain an effective but less "deep" relationship with a client until such time as it is able to develop or recruit the appropriate staff to meet the customer's needs.
The third qualitative factor is the dark and light side of relationships. As the discussion of strategic partnerships indicated, while the bank may obtain the substantial benefit of being given first refusal on any new business it can also face problems. For example, if such a customer runs into financial difficulties then the bank's reputation may be tarnished through "guilt by association". In other cases such customers have presumed because of their close relationship that the bank will support them financially without first obtaining formal agreement. In both such cases it can be very difficult for the bank to disassociate itself publicly from the customer's actions.
Indeed for each of the above categories of relationship there is a different balance between the potential dark and light side. Thus while acting as a competitive supplier the bank is disadvantaged by its limited understanding of its client's financial strategy and consequently may not be able to offer the best solution to a particular problem faced by the client. However, unless a decision has already been taken to seek to build the client relationship to one of the closer forms of relationship, within a competitive supplier relationship the bank can both offer what it regards as an appropriate level of service and also obtain the best financial return possible. In comparison, within a "relationship" the bank would need to be much more sensitive to the client's views and avoid any tendency to act opportunistically. Again where the bank is in a major supplier relationship while there may be many advantages there will almost certainly also be restrictions on its ability to deal with that customer's competitors.
For this bank the implementation of its commitment to a relationship management strategy is not a simplistic "we will have relationships". Rather it is a complex decision process where: the client's view are taken into account; the bank's resource base; and, the benefits and risks of different type of relationships are carefully balanced to assess what type of relationship the bank feels best fits its strategic plans. In other words the bank regularly adjusts the depth of its relationship with each of its customers and consequently the bank's response to an unexpected contingency arising from a customer's behaviour cannot be predicted without knowing from which customer the matter arises.
Assessment of staff resources
A different balance
Where does this leave us? NECX is an unusual but by no means unique organisation but the inappropriateness of it developing "relationships" is apparent. Obviously it does have relationships with all those with whom it does business but these are not close relationships in the sense implied by many writers on the topic of "relationships". The case of NECX acts as a reminder that there is an almost unlimited variety of forms of relationship open to an organisation and this is reinforced by the KGF Bank's position. There are cases where it is appropriate for a firm to develop relationships, within which there is a high degree of trust and considerable commitment, with some or all of its customers. On the other hand there are companies like NECX which keep their commitment to all their customers to a minimum and which only seek to develop trust with regard to certain aspects of their relationships. Thus while NECX's customers must be prepared to trust it with regard to the quality of the supplies it obtains for them from an anonymous source, they do not expect NECX to do other than behave opportunistically with regard to price.
The KGF Bank shows that relationships between a supplier and some of its customers can be very deep and close across all the dimensions which might be used to describe a relationship. Yet relationships with other customers may be less deep on some but not all of these dimensions and others point to the need to recognise that the dimensions mentioned in the literature, such as "trust", can themselves be sub-categorised.
There are no easy solutions to the question as to what type of relationship a supplier should seek to develop with its customers. However, if nothing else within organisational markets the current interest in "relationship marketing" does act as a reminder that a supplier should regularly consider what type of relationship with each significant customer best suits its circumstances. This requires a thorough understanding of:
• both the dark and the light side of relationships;
• the customers' viewpoints; and
• the costs of building and maintaining different types of relationships.
Then, depending upon the relative importance of individual customers, the supplier may need to develop an organisational structure which will enable it to manage a range of different types of relationships.
Managerial implications
These two examples suggest that there are four issues which require management's attention when it is considering its relationships with customers. First, what is the customer's opinion of the desirability of developing a close relationship with its suppliers? Some customers have clearly expressed policies in this regard. Where this is not the case, and particularly when approaching a customer for the first time, a supplier should make an assessment of the customer's likely position. Failure to do this may lead to an inappropriate approach to the customer which, at best, may lead to a wasteful use of resources and, at worst, cause the customer considerable irritation.
Second, a supplier must determine the organisational structure which they need to put into place to effectively manage their relationship with a customer. Unfortunately this may differ for each customer and a supplier can find that to set up the ideal structure for each customer would involve
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extremely elaborate and costly organisational arrangements. In such circumstances some degree of compromise between the ideal and the economic must be found. For example segmenting the market on the basis of the type of relationships customers would prefer may be necessary -with all the trade-offs that segmentation schemes necessarily involve.
Third, the supplier must carefully evaluate the resources required to maintain whatever form of relationship it decides to develop and maintain with its various customers. Particularly as a result of downsizing this is now a major problem in many firms. The difficulty is that more than ever before management needs to evaluate the alternatives to which a resource could be allocated. For example, to maintain a particular type of relationship with one customer might require a certain number of days of technical advice each year. If this is the case then it must be decided whether that number of days is available and, if not, whether they could be made available by, say, recruiting? If they are or can be made available then what alternative uses might they be put to?
Fourth, suppliers need to recognise that all relationships involve an element of risk. These risks need to be identified and evaluated so that the degree of commitment that is appropriate from its point of view can be determined. A matrix linking the risk of a relationship perceived by the supplier with the value added to the customer by the supplier's activities (see Figure 1 ) may provide a useful way for a supplier to start to evaluate this.
The argument is that customers' procurement policies range from adversarial through to relational. Where a customer adopts an adversarial procurement posture then there is considerable risk for the supplier and this will be accentuated where the supplier is adding little in value terms to the customer's activities. However, where a customer is not opposed to a relationship policy then this is less risky for the supplier and if, in addition, the supplier's product adds substantial value to the customer's activities it seems reasonable to assume that the customer will be more careful to assure itself of such supplier's capabilities. Where these are satisfactory then the supplier will enjoy an element of monopoly power. Thus the top right corner of the matrix appears the most attractive from the supplier's point of view.
Conclusions
Firms are linked together in a "dense network of co-operation and affiliation" (Richardson, 1972) . To suggest or even imply that firms do not 
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have relationships is to ignore this fact. Every organisation should recognise: that relationships cost time and effort to establish; relationships need managing; and, that the type of relationship which is appropriate should be determined in the light of the supplier's understanding of its customer's evaluation of the potential benefits of the available forms of relationship. The risk of viewing relationships as if they must involve commitment and an almost blanket trust is to ignore the rich diversity of relationships which not only exist but are appropriate in different contexts. 
Executive summary and implications for managers and executives
